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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses upon the informal and institutional governance structures which are 
embedded within local production systems in Norwegian fisheries. Important issues concern 
the regional distribution of fish catches which results from the tendency in some regional 
production systems to use large fishing vessels and the negative consequences for peripheral 
regions and inshore fisheries. The influence of powerful central production systems is 
considered in terms of territorial dominance over fishing grounds.  
  
  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURE 
Fishing communities in many of the world"s coastal regions often display well established 
fishing cultures. Most production activities which rely upon fisheries resources are, in fact, 
related to and influenced by traditions and value systems. Important elements of fishing 
competence and know-how are often developed through close contact with the material 
resources, rather than being learnt through formal education. Culture, therefore, represents an 
important concept and principle in the management of fisheries resources. It follows that the 
elaboration of management systems must take into consideration those cultural influences 
which permeate the fishing community and its participants. As fishing culture is located in 
communities on the coastal strip of fishing nations, it is identifiable as a spatial phenomenon 
(Lindkvist 1996).  
 In recent decades, it has been the case in Norway that some fishing communities have stood 
out as being more successful than others. This has been particularly true for more centrally 
located towns which have emerged as important fishing communities. These differ 
significantly from smaller, more peripheral coastal communities, in that they are less 
dependent on fishing for their economic activity and culture. In general, this situation seems 
to be symptomatic of modernisation processes which are influencing the spatial organisation 
of the fishery system in terms of both the pattern of fishing communities and the nature of 
fishing culture. 
 This paper discusses institutional governance within the fishing industry and the effects of 
socio-cultural change in leading Norwegian fishing communities. It is argued that notions of 
dependency and culture should be included in the current discourse on fisheries governance 
among fisheries economists and social scientists. Attention is given to spatial phenomena and 
the influence exerted by large, central fishing communities upon decision making processes in 
fisheries and upon the sustainability of fisheries and culture in more peripheral, fisheries 
dependent communities. A theoretical context for this discussion is provided by the new 
contextual economic geography (Martin 1994, Knox & Agnew 1997, Storper 1997). The 
paper concludes by discussing the notion of territoriality, a spatial component within the 
fisheries governance model, and the role exerted by institutions and actors in influencing 
access to fishing grounds. 
  
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
Economic geography was until the middle of the 1980s engaged in considering the location 
and dynamics of industrial activities and with the processes leading to unbalanced regional 
development. Location analysis of fish processing activities was partly characterised by a 
form of economic essentialism. It was assumed, for example, that industrial location and 
trajectories of economic development were decided according to universal and rational laws, 
as acknowledged by several neo-classical, Keynesian and Marxist economists (Martin 1994). 
Weber"s (1929) classical least-cost theory is an example of rational decisions determining 
company locations. From such a perspective, fish processing plants would be considered to 
locate close to the fishing grounds. This was often the case for primary processing and where 
substantial parts of the fish were not included in the finished product. Within such an 
approach, other choices of location would have been considered unfavourable and even 
irrational. However, regional economic development is, in practice, often complex and 
influenced by many different and contradictory tendencies. For this reason, references to one 
or other influential locational factor are often unsatisfactory. Instead attention is required to 
globalisation processes, financial, technological and scientific factors, markets, the 
organisation of production and processes of negotiation, all of which are seen to play a role in 
producing "a complex set of interrelated tendencies" (Dicken, Peck & Tickell 1997, 161). 
These tendencies interact with each other in unforeseen ways and result in economic, 
demographic and socio-cultural effects with different consequences from region to region. For 
this reason, contemporary economic geographers are interested in geographical context and its 
contingent ability to explain regional economic activities based on local technical, social and 
institutional conditions (Martin 1994, Storper 1997). Furthermore, the abilities of actors or 
places to make use of opportunities in a global world are important in understanding 
unbalanced regional development and the location of companies (Amin & Thrift 1997). 
Often, rational choices of location may be disregarded for seemingly illogical reasons. Actors 
who identify with or have their cultural roots in one place may, for example, display location 
arguments not found in rational analysis. There may also be disputes within a community over 
the local priorities that should be allowed to determine decisions and these may influence 
choices relating to location or the use of production factors. Similarly, actors in one locality 
may also be able to use their influence to force the actions of those in another, in directions 
supporting their own regional strategies. At the same time, a region"s ability to restructure 
through innovation and learning processes may also result from collaboration among actors 
and agglomeration economies, initiated or performed with the help of institutional networks. 
As a whole, the social contexts of actors may therefore differ between regions or regional 
institutions, as a result of local culture and established institutions (Martin 1994). In this way, 
institutional economic geography discusses the influence of contextual forms of social 
organisation on economic actors. 
The conception of governance by geographers focuses upon institutional or regional steering 
systems and is expressed as "...a routine, continuous and fairly intensive monitoring, 
regulation and administration of a wide range of activities in society...." (Painter 1995, 39). 
This interpretation underlines the informal aspects of governance, in contrast to legally 
organised administration and networks. Principal actors are at the forefront of this governance 
model and they act in accordance with contextual values, norms and capabilities. Culture is 
this seen to form an important element in regional governance. 
  
The discussion of institutional and regional governance is influenced by the transition from an 
official and state dominated economy to a market economy (Dicken 1998). At the same time, 
the more global integration between actors and regions is based upon new ways of organising 
production and the flows of goods and services. Of particular importance are the financial 
services and new technologies of communication which enable actors and regions to 
collaborate on a basis of individual or company demands and according to requirements in 
markets. These integration processes may also affect the formal types of governance. Strange 
(1996) has shown, for example, how relations of power in the international economy can be 
transferred from smaller to mightier nations. The influence of state regulations is reduced for 
the benefit of markets and private actors. Thus, the principles of market governance and 
participatory governance seem to receive increased attention through the globalisation 
process. 
Geographical regions function as environments for actors who display market power and 
governance in their economic actions. The influences of markets and actors are therefore 
increasingly contextual. In this respect Dicken (op.cit. 461) claims that "all markets are 
socially embedded and constituted; all have to operate within socially defined rules". Hirst 
and Thompson (1996) have also explained how institutional governance may be recognised at 
several different geographical levels. Thus, while the International monetary fund is a global 
institution, the European Union represents a regional constellation. Within a country 
governance institutions like, for example, the Norwegian Råfisklaget, have the power to make 
decisions on sales of fresh fish within certain regions. Local communities represent the 
smallest geographical level of institutional governance.  
Already by the mid-1980s geographers had discussed those specific conditions of place which 
contribute to the development of local governance institutions (Sayer 1985, Harvey 1985, 
Massey 1985). Cox (1998) sums up this debate by asking what particular attributes in 
different places contribute to power for some places, while others remain even more 
powerless than before. Sayer (1985) claimed that power and interest were influenced 
spatially, but that the influence of place was less traceable. Others, however, disagree. 
According to Massey (1985) spatial conditions are constitutive of social relations connected 
to power and governance institutions. Harvey (1985) also contends that the social relations 
which decide social class are place-specific.  
The inclusion of place and region in the question of institutional governance is related to the 
inclusion of social relations and culture as important elements of the governance discourse in 
fisheries. One important aspect of participatory governance, for example, is the knowledge 
local participants have of local fisheries and fishing grounds (Jentoft 1989). According to the 
debate, fisheries dependent regions are better able to manage the resources in a sustainable 
way and therefore secure the maintenance of communities. "In such situations the local 
community can be expected to do everything it can to manage the local resource base 
sustainably in order not to destroy the very basis of its long-term survival" (van der Schans 
1999, 114). 
  
FISHERIES DEPENDENCY AS A BASIS FOR MANAGEMENT 
The level of dependency on fisheries influences the culture of communities in a fundamental 
way. Norms and values are influenced by employment in fisheries and form the core of the 
social and cultural steering systems found within fishing communities. Fish gives work, 
identification and power. Thus, a continuous supply of fish is necessary to secure a 
sustainable fishing culture. Dependency is therefore shown through the material structures 
(boats, buildings, other constructions), actors and activities in communities. It is socially 
embedded within each local community and spatial in nature. Production structures, traditions 
and values within each community are determined and influenced by local possibilities and 
material and place-specific human resources (Cox 1998).  
As fishing places depart from each other in terms of structures and activities, these places also 
differ in the intensity of their dependency. Some places only have limited opportunities for 
alternative employment to fishing while in others, and especially the larger places or towns, 
fishing activities represent only one out of many local industrial activities. These places are 
not dependent on fisheries (in fact, in this paper they are referred to as "independent"). The 
lack of alternative employment outside the fishing sector is therefore seen as an important 
operational criteria for dependency. Indeed, the main competitors for fisheries dependent 
localities are often those fishing communities or regions which may have significant 
alternative employment resources to draw upon. While, the fishing industry remains important 
for production in such regions, alternative industries offer much higher overall levels of 
employment and they are less reliant on fishing compared to the dependent communities. 
Fisheries dependency, therefore, occurs at the interface between the exploitation of fish 
resources and the cultural values that the industry supports. The industrial activities connected 
to the utilisation of fish resources are expressed through material structures (fishing boats and 
processing plants both at sea and on land) as well as through cultural factors relating to 
competence and know-how in fishing. These factors further determine the practical decisions 
on which production activities are based. Two additional aspects need also to be highlighted. 
Firstly, dependency as a relational condition, arising from demands of necessity given that 
alternative opportunities are few and, secondly, the determining characteristics of those 
economic activities using local resources. Habermas (1984, 1987) argues that objectives of 
action may be achieved either through goal-oriented-action or through communicative action. 
Goal rational action assumes that reasonable tools are available for goal achievements. 
Communicative actions are developed through establishing communicative processes which 
use reason as a basis for debates and aim at communal interpretations of situations. However, 
the complexity of society is indisputable and this makes a shared understanding of a situation 
or action particularly difficult. For this reason, Habermas accepts that the material 
reproduction of society may be decided "behind the back" of those involved. 
Price mechanisms and bureaucratic procedural rules may contribute positively to the co-
ordination of actions. Such systemic mechanisms for co-ordination must nevertheless take 
into account the "life-world" that people experience through their culture, knowledge and 
economic activities, (Simonsen 1990, 27), and which forms the basis to their actions. 
However, social and cultural reproduction alone cannot legitimate co-ordination of social 
actions. Co-ordination mechanisms can only be defended using rational considerations: "In 
the final analysis it must be possible to back them up by good reasons" (van der Schans 1999, 
107). 
The organisation of fishing activities has been predominatly characterised by specialisation, 
centralisation and capitalisation. While some towns and regions have gained increased 
influence in the development of fisheries, many fisheries dependent regions have not been 
able to benefit from the fish resources to the extent as would be expected by their level of 
dependency. Habermas (1984, 1987), in fact, sees it as legitimate that different interest groups 
should attempt to gain support for their situation, based on their values and norms. All groups 
have a legitimate claim to work for their interests. It appears, however, that through 
communicative actions within the existing governance framework, actors from fisheries 
dependent regions have been unable to argue rationally, defend their interests or attain 
acceptance for their main arguments. 
  
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
The regulation of fisheries is aimed at resolving problems related to the exploitation of fish 
species (a biological problem), the excessive capitalisation of the industry (an economic 
problem) and the consequences for other marine animals when fish resources are exploited 
(an environmental problem) (van Vliet & Dubbink 1999). In Norway, official policy has also 
partially focused on the negative consequences of development in the fishing industry for 
fishing dependent regions (a dependency problem). Attention has been given to the workers 
and fishermen affected by declining catches and landings and to those fishing regions and 
communities facing decline in the industry and reductions in recruitment and population. The 
dependency problem, however, appears to have been given insufficient attention and has been 
underestimated, and this has prevented efficient adaptations within the industry. Instead, the 
problems of overcapitalisation and resource deficiency have dominated the Norwegian debate, 
based on questions of efficiency and rational use of resources, rather than focusing on issues 
of justice and dependency (Jakobsen 1997). 
However, it has often been the case that important decisions in world fisheries have been 
legitimised by the dependency issue. For example, decisions taken by the International Court 
of Justice at the Hague in 1951 (involving Norwegian victory over the UK over fishing 
territories), Icelandic success in repelling foreign trawlers from their waters in the late 70s, 
and the expansion of economic zones in the same decade, were wholly or partly legitimised 
by the question of dependency of coastal nations on fish resources and on the argument that 
dependency meant coastal states were better qualified to conserve resources. Decisions of 
international courts and customs have often accepted that dependency gives rights. In similar 
terms, the Norwegian government has stated that the pattern of population must be defended 
(St.meld. 1982-83, 1997-98) and that the fishing industry should contribute to developing 
working places and communities along the Norwegian coast. However, as long as 
communities remain undiversified, with few alternative industries to fishing, fisheries remains 
a question of survival for many fisheries dependent communities. These communities require 
a management system which addresses both biological and cultural sustainability. Here, the 
need is to improve access to resources in order to help communities to sustain their culture, 
fishing capabilities and employment. 
It is often stated that the conditions of management and resources must be a basis for action 
(cf. Kooiman et al., 1999). However, different interests often oppose one another and there is 
no easy way to arrive at consensus over the means of improving management or the allocation 
of resources between groups or regions. In general, fisheries resources are managed according 
to three governance principles, hierarchical governance, market governance and 
participatory governance (Kooiman et al., 1999). The discourse concerning these principles 
of institutional governance embraces the influence of different types of actors over the 
distribution of resources. Dependency, as a formal principle of governance, is not in itself an 
accepted principle for determining how to manage regulations. Instead, dependency is 
relevant in terms of the political objectives of regulation.  
All modes of governance consider the role played by the state in fisheries regulations. For 
example, the hierarchical principle presupposes that governance is implemented through the 
use of legitimate laws, and that governments "... intervene on behalf of the public interest 
when the outcomes of unregulated social interactions is not in accordance with the perceived 
public interest" (van Vliet & Dubbink 1999, 11).  
The market principle regards resource problems as resulting from market failure. Like 
hierarchical governance, it contends that problems in fisheries management can be traced 
back to governments. The proponents of market regulation consider that governmental actions 
are unable to improve imperfect market adaptation. Instead, expensive regulative activities are 
required to control unwilling actors. It is therefore argued that motives of self-interest among 
fishermen would be better adapted for the achievement of policy aims. In accordance with this 
principle, fishery economists suggest that market governance is the most appropriate way to 
manage fisheries through implementing systems of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) 
(Hannesson 1991, OECD 1993).  
The principle of participatory governance suggests greater collaboration between participants 
at different levels of organisation. However, a prerequisite for a successful participation 
strategy is that the participants at all levels change their attitudes. "Both the regulator and the 
regulated have to operate on the basis of greater mutual trust" (van Vliet & Dubbink 1999, 
24). Another important condition is that actions among participants are based upon 
"communicative rationality" and "social control". 
These governance principles have in common a demand for involvement among all actors. 
Hierarchical steering is only legitimate if members in democracies participate in processes of 
decision making. Market governance presupposes that the most efficient solutions among 
market actors also affect the content of official aims. Participatory governance intends to 
incorporate actors who are directly affected by decisions. All governance systems can 
potentially incorporate efficiency, justice and a legitimate division of power in society. This 
paper argues, however, that the division of power does not function as intended in practice. 
To a large extent, political science and sociological research have shown that the most 
powerful, educated and wealthy often have the best opportunities to influence official aims, 
even in well functioning democracies. The same also holds true for individual regions, which 
face intensive competition from one another. It appears that governance systems are unable to 
resolve two important problems, the management of fisheries in a sustainable manner and the 
means of securing the participation of those actors dependent upon fisheries. Habermas" 
demand for communicative rationality is, in other words, difficult to satisfy if dependency is 
not fully accepted as a premise for management. Basing management upon claims of 
dependency might even be deemed to be irrational or inefficient, as it runs against the current 
tendency for fisheries management and co-ordination efforts to be based on arguments of 
efficiency and profit. As the present hierarchical governance of European fisheries is often 
characterised by confusion, arising from the division of responsibility among many 
institutional actors (van Vliet & Dubbink 1999), the situation is open for many players to 
exert influence. The management system is often geared to favouring those who have 
significant capital-based investments to protect. 
  
NETWORKS AND LOCAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
Institutional economic geography describes and analyses the regional effects of economic 
activities based on institutional and contextual forms of social organisation. The concepts of 
networks, region and local production system are particularly important to consider when 
discussing regional power from an institutional perspective. A network comprises patterns of 
stable and binding relationships between actors and where membership in the network is 
characterised by a sense of community and common purpose. Within networks individuals are 
"…. engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions" (Powell 1990, 303) and 
participants are dependent on resources controlled by other members of the network. 
Networks may also be related to geographical areas and regions where systems of industrial 
interaction or territorial production are established. 
A local or territorial production system broadly comprises the production equipment (fishing 
fleets, processing facilities and ancillary services), the technological culture and the particular 
competence or skills necessary for utilising these assets. Thus, the knowledge of how local 
and regional labour markets function, how specific technologies operate and how markets 
relate to local products are all integral features of the system. Together, these physical and 
intellectual assets give the territorial production system its specific regional characteristics 
(Crevoisier & Maillat, 1991; Conti, 1993; Grotz & Braun, 1993). 
Economic institutions or their representatives represent important components of local 
production systems (Crevoisier and Maillat 1991, Lindkvist 1994, 1997a). These 
representatives are typically referred to as protagonists or principal actors. They work 
according to the accepted cultures and meaning systems found in the geographical areas 
which contain the production system, and from a common basis of interpretation and 
understanding of events. They must also operate within a regional production environment, 
which includes elements of organisation, technical culture and competence and which may be 
influenced by imbalance in the geographical division of production. Within production 
systems it is crucial that knowledge of international fisheries, competition, new technology 
and markets for fish products are understood from a local, as well as from an external and 
global perspective. 
An increasing geographical concentration of production in Norway is closely connected to the 
way fishermen and other actors organise themselves when competing for scarce resources. 
Figure 1 illustrates some of the processes at work in terms of contrasting local production 
systems. In traditional fishery dependent systems, for example, actors are flexibly organised, 
which allows them to cope with fluctuations in the availability of fish within the local fishing 
grounds. Both individuals and institutions are organised through a set of dependency 
relations, where actors perform their own specific tasks and conform to the basic values of the 
local community (Wadel, 1980; Jentoft & Wadel, 1984; Seierstad et al., 1985). Mutual 
dependence demands that the community as a whole strongly supports these basic values. For 
this reason, actors in the traditional production systems are often sceptical towards radical 
changes which may appear to threaten the established fishing culture. 
  
By contrast, modern production systems are typically located in towns and communities 
which are less dependent on fisheries and which are often more centrally placed. These are 
mostly characterised by offshore or deep sea fishing activities and larger processing plants. In 
these more modern, centrally located fishing communities, vessel owners, shipyards, 
consultancies, banks and, in some cases, research institutions are able to collaborate in the 
construction of larger, efficient fishing vessels. This enables them to exploit more distant 
fishing grounds and to break their traditional links with local fisheries. Indeed, modern factory 
trawlers, often processing their catches on board, may often gain access to fishing grounds 
exploited by inshore fishermen using small boats and less sophisticated gears. 
  
 Figure 1: Changes in traditional and modern fishing industries (Lindkvist 1999) 
  
The region of Ålesund, which represents the main area for fishing within Møre and Romsdal 
county on the western coast of Norway, has in recent decades become an important centre of 
Norwegian fisheries and is a typical example of the modern production environment. The 
region has dynamic and varied industries controlled by an expanding business environment. 
Here, leaders of companies interact through informal social networks which serve to secure 
the competitive position of the locality in relation to other Norwegian, as well as international 
fishing regions. They are also experienced in adapting to competition, coping with official 
regulations and seeking funding opportunities. The local fishery system is further 
characterised by a numbre of research and educational institutions as well as expert vessel 
consultancy firms and specialised shipyards. In addition, the region benefits from hosting one 
of Norway"s largest banks which channels substantial flows of capital to the Norwegian and 
the international fishery systems. Together this agglomeration of financial, shipbuilding and 
research capabilities produces particularly favourable conditions for fishing companies and 
the fish processing industry of the region and notably in the development and funding of 
modern fishing trawlers able to compete successfully in both national and international waters 
(Mariussen 1990, Lindkvist 1993, 1994, 1997). This combination of locational advantages has 
in recent decades allowed Ålesund to exert increasing influence over a greater share of 
Norwegian fisheries. 
  
EXPANDING TERRITORIAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS IN ACTION  
Global fish landings have increased fivefold since 1950. This development has mainly been 
due to the increased use of modern technology in fisheries. Large deep-sea fishing trawlers, 
with advanced machinery and modern production equipment, have been able to fish on distant 
fishing grounds and store the catches for weeks on end without detriment to fish quality. The 
increase in world fisheries production has, however, also been accompanied by a series of 
conflicts between deep-sea going trawlers and inshore fishermen. Large modern trawlers have 
a number of advantages over inshore vessels; they are often able to arrive first at fishing 
grounds; they can land larger quantities of fish and they are able to move from one fishing 
ground to another. The situation is such that coastal fishermen in Norway, for example, have 
often faced increasing difficulties from large trawlers (Lindkvist 1994, 1996a,b).  
The production systems of modern capital intensive fisheries, based in central fishery 
"independent" communities, are also seen to depart from traditional forms of organisation, as 
well as from meeting the demands for sustainable fisheries exploitation. In a European 
context, these systems are geographically concentrated within a narrow range of fishing 
nations (FAO Fisheries Database 2000), including Russia (ranked no 4 in the world in 1997 
measured by catches of marine species, metric tons), Norway (ranked 8), Iceland (11) and 
Spain (16) and particular regions (notably Murmansk, Ålesund, Reykjavik and Vigo). 
Ålesund, for example, accounts for about 80 per cent of Norwegian factory trawlers 
(Lindkvist 1994, Sanden Nilsen 1994). Local production systems in these regions commonly 
display internal socio-cultural, technological and economic factors which may produce 
particular competitive advantages. In some cases, for example, actors are able to make use of 
externally initiated technology. Furthermore, they are able to restructure their economic 
activities when necessary and organise themselves politically, as well as being able to adapt to 
international resource situations and market demands. The regions emerge as the winners in 
world fisheries and the holders of the greatest degree of influence over approaches to fisheries 
governance. 
  
REGIONAL CONCENTRATION IN FISHING CAPACITY 
It is a fact in Norway that the level of fish landings, technological sophistication and quota 
holdings are closely connected to size of fishing vessel (Lindkvist 1996). In Norway, these 
vessels are more spatially concentrated within certain regions (Figure 2), in Møre and 
Romsdal, including the Ålesund region (the cod fisheries), and Hordaland (the pelagic 
fisheries). Together these western counties have progressively increased their relative share of 
the Norwegian fleet over 30 m. Indeed, the development of the high value cod fisheries 
demonstrates well the importance of large fishing vessels in determining the volume of 
catches for different Norwegian fishing regions. Thus, cod landings by vessels from Møre and 
Romsdal have increased in terms of their share of Norwegian catches from 24 per cent in 
1980 to 33 per cent in 1995. In contrast, the largest relative decrease is seen in Finnmark, 
which faced a reduction from 19 per cent to 15 percent over the same period (Data from 
Fiskeridirektoratet 1998). 
  
 
Figure 2: Geographical distribution of large Norwegian fishing boats of more than 30 metres 
  
 Table 1: Relative share of catches (volume) in Norwegian cod fisheries 
  1980 1995 
  
Møre and Romsdal 
Finnmark 
Rest of Norway 
24% 
19% 
57% 
33% 
15% 
52% 
Catches in 1000 tons 560 707 
Source: The fishery database and Fiskeridirektoratet 
  
A similar regional concentration has also taken place in the herring, sprat, mackerel and 
capelin fisheries. Here, the county of Hordaland has dominated regional changes between 
1980 and 1995 (Table 2). 
  
Table 2: Relative share of catches (volume) in Norwegian pelagic fisheries 
  1980 1995 
Hordaland 
Rest of Norway 
26% 
74% 
33% 
67% 
Catches in 1000 tons 1703 707 
Source: The fishery database and Fiskeridirektoratet 
  
TERRITORIALITY 
The market principle of governance has not been fully adopted in Norwegian fisheries. The 
introduction of modern fishing vessels with improved fishing capabilities, supported by 
expansion into new fishing grounds, has provided sufficient gains in terms of efficiency to 
satisfy vested interests in the Norwegian fishery system. Furthermore, instead of opting for a 
system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), Norway has evolved an informal system of 
transferable licences (ITLs) and a flourishing market in the buying and selling of vessels and 
quota licences. The main emphasis has been placed upon the introduction of improved vessels 
and upon funding of projects intended to strengthen the regional participation in the fisheries. 
According to the definition of institutional and regional governance identified at the outset of 
this paper (Painter 1995) attention should be given to the control, monitoring and regulation 
of fishery-based activities in society. This paper has stressed the importance of the spatial 
aspects of governance in relation to local production systems and the activities of principal 
actors in leading fishing regions. As long as the leading actors in these geographical delimited 
regions are able to introduce new types of efficient fishing vessels and collect more quotas 
through the purchase of vessels, they will continue to wield significant levels of control within 
the Norwegian fishery system. This has important distributional consequences in terms of 
regional development and conditions for participation in fisheries, and in the fulfilment of 
policy objectives. 
  
It seems to be the case, therefore, that actors located in central fishing towns in Norway have 
increasingly exercised what geographers call (cf. Sack 1986) territoriality in terms of their 
domination of fishing activities and fishing grounds. Territorial power or governance is 
recognised in the way that actors from within or outside a region can affect, influence or 
control the actions or the admittance of other participants. Actors from fisheries 
"independent" communities appear to defend territoriality in several ways. One group of 
actors may secure their right to fish, in terms of increased quotas or larger fishing vessels, 
through communicative actions, for example by writing reports or through posing convincing 
arguments. More often, leading actors will use technology and capital to establish efficient 
production regimes, which serve to alter the conditions of production in their favour. This 
exercise of power is seen in the examples of efficient Norwegian fishing vessels which 
switched the location of their catches from coastal areas to the more distant fishing grounds 
around 1980 and which forced other coastal fishermen to follow the new patterns of 
production (Lindkvist 1994). 
Territorial governance also resembles a centre-periphery relationship when powerful 
territorial elites are able to influence systems of both value and production in such a way that 
others must adjust their activities (Lindkvist 1996). The use of large fishing vessels in central 
towns is associated with, and defended according to, a particular cultural and normative 
perspective of technology. In contrast, the values which are embedded within coastal 
production systems in northern Norway, reject the use of modern, deep-sea based fishing 
technology. Actors from central regions are, in effect, free to expand their territories and 
functions without significant competition from the periphery. The result is a territorial 
governance regime established through the use of technology, capital and culture. 
  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has considered the effects of informal power relations upon fishing activities and 
the regional distribution of fish resources. This has involved positioning the concept of 
territorial or regional governance within the discourse of fisheries management. Mechanisms 
of informal governance are seen to be related to place-specific characteristics, for example an 
efficient production system, the presence of competent actors or the availability of necessary 
capital, and are considered to represent important factors influencing the development of 
European fisheries. Geography, therefore, clearly matters, and this calls for more concerted 
attention upon the issue of territoriality as a governance principle and the way large fishing 
municipalities influence fishing dependent communities. 
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